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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
STATE V. BABY: A WOMAN MAY WITHDRAW CONSENT 
FOR SEXUAL INTERCOURSE AFTER PENETRATION, AND 
CONTINUATION OF SEXUAL INTERCOURSE AFTER 
WITHDRAWAL OF CONSENT THROUGH FORCE OR 
THREAT OF FORCE CONSTITUTES RAPE. 
By: Katlyn Hood 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that first-degree rape 
includes vaginal intercourse that continues with force or threat of force 
after the victim withdraws initial consent post-penetration. State v. 
Baby, 404 Md. 220, 946 A.2d 463 (2008). More specifically, the court 
rejected Maryland case law that suggested that if a woman consents 
prior to penetration and withdraws the consent following penetration, 
there is no rape. Baby, 404 Md. at 238,946 A.2d at 473. 
On December 13, 2003, lL. was in the backseat of her car with 
Maouloud Baby ("Baby"), whom she had met at the local McDonald's 
restaurant. Baby told J.L. that he wanted to have sexual intercourse 
with her. J.L. agreed, so long as he stopped when she told him. Baby 
then attempted to have intercourse with lL., but she told him it hurt 
and said "stop" as she sat up. Baby did not stop and continued to have 
intercourse with J.L. as she tried to push Baby off with her knees. 
Baby was charged in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
with first-degree rape and other sexual offenses. During jury 
deliberations, the jury asked the trial judge whether the withdrawal of 
consent after penetration constituted rape. The judge replied by 
restating the original jury instructions. The jury found Baby guilty of 
first-degree rape. Baby appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland, which reversed, holding that if a woman consents to 
intercourse and then withdraws the consent after penetration, there is 
no rape. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted the State's 
petition for writ of certiorari. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed whether a woman, 
who initially consents to sexual intercourse, withdraws that consent 
after penetration, and then is forced to continue sexual intercourse, is a 
victim of rape. Baby, 404 Md. at 237, 946 A.2d at 473. Baby urged 
114 
2008] Post-Penetration Withdrawal of Consent 115 
the court to rely on language used in prior Maryland case law, which 
suggested that a woman's post-penetration withdrawal of consent does 
not constitute rape. Baby, 404 Md. at 244, 946 A.2d at 477 (citing 
Battle v. State, 287 Md. 675, 684,414 A.2d 1266, 1270 (1980». The 
court rejected Baby's argument, finding that the language from Battle, 
which Baby relied on, was mere dicta. Baby, 404 Md. at 246, 946 
A.2d at 478. Therefore, it was not persuasive in whether post-
penetration withdrawal of consent is rape in the present case. Id. 
The court also considered the historical roots of virginity and the 
concept of penetration in relation to the crime of rape and the issue of 
consent. Id. at 247, 946 A.2d at 479. Essential to this discussion is the 
fact that English common law was based on the Old Testament and the 
belief that rape was complete upon penetration. Id at 248, 946 A.2d at 
479. The damage to the father's and the husband's interest in the 
woman's reproductive abilities was complete at the moment of 
penetration. Id. It was this belief that led to the idea that a woman was 
"de-flowered" upon penetration, and if consent was given prior to 
penetration and then withdrawn, there was no rape. Id. However, by 
the 13th century, the reference to virginity or the status of the victim 
was removed from English law. Id at 251, 946 A.2d at 481. 
By the time Maryland adopted the English common law in 1639, 
penetration did not complete the harm, and a virgin was not the only 
possible victim of rape. Id. at 248-49, 946 A.2d at 479-80. The issue 
of post-penetration withdrawal of consent arose infrequently in 
American case law. Id at 253, 946 A.2d at 482. The cases in 
American history suggest that consent has to be withdrawn prior to 
penetration to constitute rape. Id at 254, 946 A.2d at 483. While that 
rule was not explicitly stated, the courts did not focus directly on the 
point at which consent was withdrawn. Id. at 255, 946 A.2d at 483 
(citing State v. McCaffrey, 19 N.W. 331 (1884); State v. Cunningham, 
12 S.W. 376 (1889». 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland also considered other 
jurisdiction's holdings on post-penetration withdrawal of consent. 
Baby, 404 Md. at 255,946 A.2d at 483. The court found that only one 
state held that the withdrawal of consent after penetration was not 
rape. Baby, 404 Md. at 255, 946 A.2d at 483 (citing State v. Way, 254 
S.E.2d 760 (N.C.1979». The court did not find the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina's holding persuasive because it did not provide any 
further analysis beyond its holding or cite to any authority as a basis 
for its reasoning. Baby, 404 Md. at 255,946 A.2d at 484. 
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All other jurisdictions addressing this issue held that if sexual 
intercourse continues through force or threat of force after withdrawal 
of consent, it is rape. Id. at 256, 946 A.2d at 484. The Supreme 
Judicial Court of Maine held that it is rape if intercourse is continued 
after withdrawal of consent when the woman originally consented 
because she was forced or threatened with force. Id. at 256, 946 A.2d 
at 484 (citing State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067 (Me. 1985)). The high 
court explained that the important element was not only the 
withdrawal of consent, but more importantly, the continuation of 
intercourse through force. Baby, 404 Md. at 256, 946 A.2d at 484 
(citing Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1070). Other jurisdictions agreed that if 
sexual intercourse continues through force or threat of force after the 
withdrawal of consent, such conduct constitutes rape. Baby, 404 Md. 
at 256, 946 A.2d at 484. The Court of Appeals of Maryland found the 
holdings of these jurisdictions persuasive in reaching its holding in the 
present case. Id. at 259,946 A.2d at 486. 
The court concluded that if sexual intercourse was deemed to end at 
the moment of penetration, it would lead to illogical results not 
considered by the drafters of the rape statutes. /d. The Maryland rape 
statute, like those of other jurisdictions, punishes penetration, which 
continues after the withdrawal of consent. Id. Based on the above 
analysis, the court found no case law that supported the holding that 
initial penetration completes the act of sexual intercourse. Id. 
Therefore, the court held that forcing a woman to continue sexual 
intercourse after she withdraws her consent is rape. Id. at 260, 946 
A.2d at 486. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland's holding expands Maryland 
first-degree rape law. Now, rape occurs not only when intercourse is 
forced upon a person in the absence of consent, but also when a victim 
withdraws consent after penetration. Maryland practitioners, when 
trying a case that concerns rape, will now not only have to consider 
whether there was original consent prior to sexual intercourse, but also 
whether that consent continued throughout the sexual encounter or 
was withdrawn after penetration. If the victim withdraws original 
consent after penetration and sexual intercourse continues through 
force or threat of force, under Maryland law, rape has been committed. 
